The Catholic Lawyer
Volume 14
Number 4 Volume 14, Autumn 1968, Number 4

Article 5

Implications of the Allen Textbook Decision
Robert F. Drinan, S.J.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl
Part of the Religion Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE
ALLEN TEXTBOOK DECISIONt
ROBERT F. DRINAN, S.J. *

M

ORE THAN A FEW QUESTIONS arise from the not entirely satis-

I
factory rationale and reasoning of the majority opinion in the
Allen I decision.
The questions which will be discussed here include the following:
1) What precisely is the meaning of the terms "sectarian
school" or "religious institution" as these notions are used in Justice
White's opinion? If a "sectarian school" teaches secular subjects, is
state aid for such teaching permissible regardless of the intimacy of
the church-relatedness of the school?
2) What is the prohibition by the Supreme Court of the
"inhibition" of religion in McGowan,2 Schempp3 and Allen likely to
mean in future decisional law?
3)
Does Allen mean that the severe "anti-aid" amendments in
a large number of state constitutions are open to challenge as being
inconsistent with the establishment clause of the Federal Constitution?
4) Is there an argument that Allen has in effect contributed to
the establishment of the "secular" or to the establishment of a form
of secularism?
What is a "Sectarian School"?
Justice White was not very clear or cogent when he dismissed
the appellants' case by stating that "we cannot agree . . . either that
tAn address before the 91st Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, August 4, 1968.
• Dean of the Boston College Law School.
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), wherein it was held that
a N.Y. statute requiring public school authorities to lend textbooks free of
charge to students in certain grades, including those in private schools, was
not violative of the establishment or free exercise clauses of the first amendment when applied to students in parochial schools.
2 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
3 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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all teaching in a sectarian school is religious or that the processes of secular
and religious training are so intertwined
that secular textbooks furnished to students by the public are in fact instrumental in the teaching of religion." 4 It
may be that this conclusion is inevitable if
one holds, as Justice White put it, that
"this Court has long recognized that religious schools pursue two goals, religious
instruction and secular education." 5
This latter conclusion Justice White
supports by citing Pierce,0 a decision
which, he asserts, had the premise that
"the State's interest in education would
be served sufficiently by reliance on the
secular teaching that accompanied religious training in the schools maintained
by the Society of Sisters."'
The use of
the term "accompanied" tends to beg the
crucial question whether the Pierce decision, by allowing church-related schools
to have the enormous state aid available
in the truancy laws, did not, in effect,
make the further subsidization of sectarian schools inevitable. The fact (which
no one wants to acknowledge) is that
Pierce gave to Catholic and other religious schools far more aid than was given to these schools in Everson " or Allen.
Pierce gave to the private and sectarian
school a juridical existence and the power
to use the truancy laws of the nation to
bring Catholic children into a Catholic

4Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248
(1968).
5 Id. at 245.
6Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
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school for the twelve years of their compulsory schooling.
One could argue persuasively that
Pierce gives an enormous benefit to religion and is therefore patently contrary
to the "no-aid to religion" interpretation
of the establishment clause. If, on the
other hand, one desires to retain Pierce
but to maintain that Everson or at least
Allen was wrongly decided, he must advance a justification for the Pierce result
which will make it somehow consistent
with the ban, enunciated in Schempp and
Allen, of all state action whose "primary
effect" is to aid religion. The "primary
effect" of Pierce- and indeed perhaps
the "primary purpose" of Pierce-was
to aid religion.
This is the first and most important
dilemma which the Allen decision approached but then avoided. The Allen
opinion hinted at the fact that Pierce
made Allen inevitable when Allen stated
that

Cochran 9

was

a

"corollary"

of

Pierce. But the Court nonetheless avoided the crucial question: can the state
allow a group of parents to opt out of
the public school system, create fully accredited schools aided by the state's truancy laws, and then deny that aid which
Justice White says is a "corollary" of
Pierce?
The majority opinion in Allen seeks to
blur the question of the permeation of
religion into secular subjects in churchrelated schools by stating that the public's
"continued willingness to rely on private
school systems, including parochial sys-

(1925).

392 U.S. at 245 (emphasis added).
8 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
(1947).
7

U.S.

1

9 Cochran
v. Louisiana State
281 U.S. 370 (1930).
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tems, strongly suggests that a wide segment of informed opinion, legislative and
otherwise, has found that those schools
do an acceptable job of providing secular
education to their students." 10 All of
this may be so, but it is not responsive
to the allegation of the plaintiffs that the
textbook law of New York gave aid to
Catholic schools in a way inconsistent
with the substance and spirit of the establishment clause.
It may be that the Supreme Court will
never be able to be very logical or consistent about aid to sectarian schools until it explores the second part of its own
definition of neutrality and gives some
thought and content to the "inhibition"
of religion which the Court condemned in
McGowan, Schempp and Allen. Let us
then turn to this intriguing concept of
the unconstitutionality of governmental
"inhibition" of religion.
What is the "Inhibition" of Religion?
It is indeed curious that Church-State
literature contains no discussion of the
concept of the "inhibition" of religion
which the Supreme Court made an essential part of its notion of governmental
neutrality between religion and irreligion.
The word "inhibition" is not a legal term.
In its dictionary definition it means "any
impediment to free activity, expression or
functioning, - especially any psychical
activity imposing restraint upon another
activity."
Almost any activity of the state in the
field of secular education could be
deemed to be an inhibition of religion
and to constitute at least some "psychical
10 392 U.S. at 247-48.

activity imposing restraint" on the forces
of religion. But the 36 lawsuits now
pending in 12 federal and 24 state courts
dealing with tax support to religiously
affiliated schools do not raise the "inhibition" prohibition. These suits are all
brought by plaintiffs who seek to demonstrate that certain financial grants to
church-related schools constitute an impermissible "advancement" of religion.
The meaning of the prohibition of the
"inhibition" of religion may well be the
next crucial issue in establishment cases.
The Supreme Court in banning both the
advancement and the inhibition of religion meant to clarify that "wholesome
neutrality" which the Court adopted as
its interpretation of the establishment
clause. But the "inhibition" of religion
which the Court forbade has not yet
been the subject of even dicta in decisions dealing with the establishment
doctrine.
Even a casual inspection of the number of occasions when the Supreme Court
has reiterated its "no advancement-no
inhibition" test, in McGowan, Schempp
and Allen, indicates that the widely held
notion that the establishment clause has
been construed to mean "no-aid-toreligion" is a distortion of what the Court
has said.
The amazing silence about the implications of the Court's prohibition of any
state action whose "primary effect" is
the "inhibition" of religion may be explainable in part by the posture of contemporary Church-State cases. Despite
the "no-aid" orientation of the moving
parties in the pending 36 lawsuits, however, decisional law may soon be ex-
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pounding on the enormous ramifications
of. the' Supreme Court's interdiction of
any "inhibition" of religion.
I The "inhibition". of religion which, has
been condemned by the Court as unconstitutional does not refer to'any infringement of the. free exercise of a person's
religion. A long line of Supreme Court
decisions on the .free. exercise clause, has
amply demonstrated. fthe thrust of that
guarantee., The "inhibition" which is forbidden relates to any pattern ofj govern-.
mental conduct which has either. as its
primary purpose or its primary effect the.
inhibition of institutionalized religion.
Any other interpretation of. the "no advancement-no inhibition" test seems
impossible.
.
When, then, does ..the state, "inhibit"
religion? It is submitted that any law
which creates serious • difficulties for
church-related groups .in teir attempts
to integrafeihe sacred and the secular in
a system of education is arguably '"an
"inhibition" *of ,teligion and 'consequently
a violation of the establishm-ent'-lause. '
It niay "ble 6rged in reply to this contention that' the'Court did not 'gay "that
religion- has to be subsi dized "in order* to
prevent its "inhi6itidn" While this ass'ertion is 'true,' the fact' remains '"that the
Court, while clearly'fbrbidding 'aid'td16 religion, also firmly held that the' 'vast
power of. government -'inay.. not discdurage, impede or even, 'in a. remarkably
strong word, ":,'inhibit" religion.' If the
parents and patrons of parochial! schools
contend that the :governrnent. must. give.
further, aid to church-related schools, -because otherwise the ,state is inhibiting religion, their contention 'has more,;cogency
,.1
than may .appear at this time.-;- '
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It should be noted that the;, ban on
governmeital ,"inhibition" of religion goes
further than any previous test set forth
by the Supreme Court. It is broader than
the distinction used in the polygamy cases
to the effect that the right to religious
belief is absolute but that the right to act
upoh religious belief is not. The "inhibition,"-. -norm, moreover, would seem to be
more sweeping than the test of direct and
indirect restraints on religious- exercise
employed 'by the Court in some-: of the
cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses.'
.The inhibition test may be the' critical
norm in the emerging, struggle over -the
constitutionality of the severe "anti-aid"
amendments which exist in the constitutions of several of the states.. The impact
of Allen on. ,these provisions deserve exploring.
Can State "Blaine Amendments"
Survive Allen?
;It is somewhat anomalous that there
has been little; if any protest over the
fact that,:Congress has on' several., occasions. "subverted" ,the "anti-aid" amendments, of the,,several state constitutions
by. allowing sectarian 'groups within thesd
states..to apply directly to Washington-for
theirO share *'of aid. This,.practice .*started
in,' 1946 with'. the. National -School Lunch
Act.. The.., most -recent example of it. is
the ' 1965 -Elemenitaty, and Secondary
School- Assistance Act (ESEA) which
allows parochial schools to request: aiid
receive Federal aid'.even 'though, the reception. :of such'aid, is -.specifically contrary to the conttu ,tion of.. tho state in
which the school -is located-, !..- - .The Allen decision, by validating aid
for the secular aspects. :.qf .:s.ect~rian
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schools, clearly raises the question of the
constitutionality of those state prohibitions
of any aid to a fully. accredited school.
simply because, to cite some typical language, it is "directly or indirectly under
the control of a religious body." To. be
sure, Allen made no specific finding as to
the over-all question of permeation. It
simply stated that in the case before the
Court no proof of permeation existed.
But the thrust of Allen is that the state
cannot'have it both ways: the state cannot permit the church-related school' to
substitute for a public school for the purposes of the secular education' required
of all young Americans while at the.
same time the state condemns that -school.
a. priori as, a sectarian iristitutiorr dig ,
qualified for any share of -that' governmental assistance given to other 'schools
at which children , can: fulfill their' legal
obligations under 'the truancy laws: -....
The Allen decision -raises, in other.
words, the fundamental.- public . policyquestion of what ideology, or orientation
or philosophy the goyernment, in Americamay or must endorse and/or 5upport. in
its, schools-... The nineteenth century-"antiaid" amendments adopted the. policy, of,
giving support only to the secular pubh'c
school. Oregon in 1923, by' a popular
referendum, voted to push this policy. to
its logical extreme and to outlaw all nqnpublic.. schools. The Pierce decision reversed .this. referendum and held that.
private, schools -have a constitutional right
to exjst. Everson -and Allen have ruled.
that states may, if they. so desire, aid
those private -schools which they, cannot
constitutionally refuse to license.
The crucial question remains: does the
Pierce-Everson-Allen -rationale nMeah that

289.

a state cannot consistently and/or constitutionally prefer public' schools over pri '
vate schools? Does a state have the right
to "use" 'church-related school for the
purposes -of compulsory 'education and
yet deny them all aid except' their juridical existence? 'Does the mere- prsence
of' an affiliation with' a church on the
part of an elementary or secondary school
justify! a denial of aid to -the pupils who
attend these schools? '
The Allen decision, like' the Pierce 'ruling, indulges in answers without questions
and leaves the juridical status of the nonpublic,' religiously affiliated school to the
mercies of* 'state legislatures wvhe're the
century-old ban on aid. to denominational
schools, .impedes creative thought. .The
Allen .decision, means ,in effect, that the
religious orientation of the, electorate is
likely to, be more significant than any
reasoned approach to the complex question. of..the role of the state vis-a-vis the
types of education, which it demands or
allows all children under 16 to acquire.
It is submitted that the Allen decision
severely undercuts the validity of ".'Blaine
Amendments" at the state level and that
states, pursuant to the Allen rationale
"that parochial schools are performing,
in addition to their sectarian. function,'
the task of secular education," may not
refuse all aid to these schools merely because of their religious affiliation. At.
least states may not do so until or unless
there' is proof of that permeation- not
found by the majority of the Court in
Alien-'which would convert secular
education into sectarian indoctrination.
This question leads us to our fourth
inquiry: can the Allen decision be said
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to constitute an establishment of the secular or of secularism?
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The Christian Century, a Protestant
weekly, stated in its July 17, 1968 issue
that Justice Black's "vehement" dissent
"could be interpreted as anti-Catholic."
Transmitting this allegation it must be
conceded that the "sectarian religious
propagandists" who think that "sectarian
religious purposes" should be carried on
in school have at least a right to have
their aims stated more clearly and more
fairly in a Supreme Court opinion.
If Mr. Justice White blandly assumes
that there is no permeation by the sectarian of the secular in Catholic schools,
Mr. Justice Black assumes the opposite
-that the "religious sectarian purposes"
of a Catholic school permeate all of its
secular teaching.
The question as suggested by Justice
White and Justice Black assumes that
there is a form of secular education
which is neutral as between religion and

irreligion and that the government in its
schools may transmit this form of secular
education without being involved in either
the "advancement" or the "inhibition" of
religion. This assumption is based on the
supposed neutrality of the public school
as it exists today. But can this assumption stand up against the convictions of
the parents of every eighth child in
America? The parents of these six million children who are in church-related
schools (92%
of them in Catholic
schools) assert that the public school by
emphasizing only the secular and eliminating the scriptural sacred and even
spiritual aspects of Western culture presents a distortion of the total reality of
life and thereby inhibits religion and thus
establishes secularism.
These parents to be sure have received
in Allen a small amount of relief in the
financing of their church-related schools.
But it is relief which gives a new centrality to the public school in that the
textbooks chosen must be approved as
"secular" and not "sectarian" by public
school officials. The textbooks must, in
other words, be thoroughly conformable
to the secular orthodoxy of the public
school.
12
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Allen,
contributes unwittingly by his shrill rhetoric to the cogency of the contention that
the Allen decision has apotheosized the
secular and to that extent has violated
the establishment clause. Justice Douglas
in a series of examples has stated by
clear implication that any theistic interpretation of anthropology or of biology

111ld. at 251 (dissenting opinion).

d21d. at 254 (dissenting opinion).

Does Allen Establish Secularism?
It is somewhat disconcerting, to say
the least, for advocates of aid of churchrelated schools to be characterized in
Justice Black's dissent in Allen as follows:
The same powerful sectarian religious
propagandists who have succeeded in securing passage of the present law to help
religious schools carry on their sectarian
religious purposes can and doubtless will
continue their propaganda, looking toward complete domination and supremacy
of their particular brand of religion.11
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could not be communicated in a public
school.
But Justice Douglas has not
even noticed the case which he has built,
a case which demonstrates that the public
school, as he envisions it, is not neutral
and is not impartial as between religion
and irreligion. It is, in Justice Douglas'
own words, pervasively secular and nontheistic.
If one starts with the assumption that
the public secular school as it exists today is perfectly neutral and not biased in
favor of the secular as against the sacred,
one is merely canonizing the orthodoxy
of the public school. To say that this
type of orthodoxy is the one constitutionally permissible philosophy which the
government may assist and advance is at
best a highly debatable proposition.
Justice Fortas appears to have accepted the prevailing idea that textbooks
chosen by public school officials will be
secular and therefore neutral with respect
to religion. Justice Fortas, although dissenting,1 3 would apparently have validated
the New York textbook law if the books
to be loaned to private school students
were the same books as public school
children used. Such an arrangement
would probably not result in anything
substantially different from the results of
the existing law except that the centrality
and the exclusive legitimacy of the public
school would have been further enhanced.
The assumption that the modern-day
public school neither advances nor inhibits religion is a premise of each of the
four opinions in the Allen case. It is an

13 Id. at 269 (dissenting opinion).

assumption widely held in American society. Any suggestion that it is misleading and even false immediately elicits the
retort that the state cannot aid religion.
But such a retort completely misses the
point of those who say that the public
school, by highlighting the secular as the
exclusively important reality of life, thereby downgrades the sacred, abandons a
position of neutrality between religion
and irreligion and, in violation of the
substance and the spirit of the First
Amendment, literally "establishes" a secular or non-sacred form of religion.
Those persons whose religious faith
does not radiate itself into secular culture
are usually unable to see any establishment of a non-sacred orthodoxy in the
public school. But for those adherents
of faiths such as Orthodox Judaism,
Catholicism and some Protestant denominations to whom a fusion of the sacred
and the secular is a religious imperative
the public secular school is an institution
which is inconsistent with their basic
viewpoint of reality.
American law has not yielded to these
individuals but has perpetrated a cultural
monism and a secular orthodoxy in the
public school. The ideology behind that
secular orthodoxy may be rooted in
Judaeo-Christian morality but it is today
separated from that morality. The ideology or orthodoxy of the public school
may communicate moral and spiritual
values acceptable to most non-religionists
and to some religionists in America. But
the wide acceptance of the public school
should not be a reason for a policy which
gives aid to dissenters only by strengthening the centrality of the public school and
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by insisting that the secular learning it
imparts and the secular textbooks it utilizes -are so. neutral that they cannot advance or inhibit religion. Such a view is
naive, unrealistic and a further confirmation of the cogency of the contention that
the public school establishes a religion or
a non-religion, in a way forbidden by the
first amendment.
'Judge Van Voorfiis, dissenting in the
New York Court of Appeals in the Allen
case,' 4 urged that the New York textbook
law -was unwise because it would put
secular books into religious schools and
thereby lead to state domination of the
1420 N.Y.2d 109, 118, 228 N.E.2d 791, 795,
281 N.Y.S.2d
opinion).'

799,

805

(1967)

(dissenting
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church. A curious argument, to be sure,
but one which raises the central issue
underlying the Pierce-Cochran-EversonAllen line of decisions. That issue might
be phrased as follows: What interpretation of the establishment clause permits
the state to claim that all of education at
the primary and secondary level belongs
exclusively to the government?
It is submitted that the decisions from
Pierce to Allen have been correct in their
results but that their reasoning has 'not
faced up to the fact that the monopoly
which the public school has on tax funds
and the centrality it enjoys as the dispenser of a secular or non-sacred orthodoxy constitute a massive inhibition of
religion and an unconstitutional establishment of secular values.

